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NOTES
NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN:
PROHIBITION ON CHILD CUSTODY
AS CIVIL BRANDING FOR
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
DEBORAH AHRENS--
During the past twenty years, several states have implemented statutory and com-
mon law presumptions against child custody for persons convicted of selected
crimes. In this Note Deborah Ahrens argues that diese measures represent an ef-
fort to mark convicted persons socially, rather than an attempt to protect children.
Because the "best interest of tire child" standard currently permits courts to take
into account any factors which affect child well-being wihen awarding custody, and
because conduct considered under new law includes conduct outside the parenting
ambi4 statutory and common law presumptions operate to brand convicted persons
as "other." Ahrens analogizes new child custody provisions to other forms of col-
lateral civil punishment for convicted persons, including disenfranchisement and
deportation. The Note concludes that because these legal measures assume that tie
sort of person who would commit a crime is the sort of person who would harm a
child-absent any evidence that the parent poses a danger to the child-parents
convicted of selected crimes are unjustly denied child custody.
INTRODUCrION
Among the sternest penalties a society can impose is to deny indi-
viduals the ability to maintain relationships with their own children or
to designate them too dangerous to live with the children of their part-
ners. Traditionally, the "best interest of the child" standard has re-
quired courts to allocate custody to parents based on the conduct of
those parents toward the child, rather than on the conduct of those
parents toward their community.' Over the course of the past fifteen
years, however, states and courts have begun to qualify parental cus-
todial2 potential based on criminal conduct. Common law and stat-
* I would like to thank the New York University Law Review staff for its assistance in
developing and editing this Note, particularly Iris Bennett, Lewis Bossing, Joanne
Brandwood, Sally Kesh, and Tom Woods. Special thanks to Catherine Amirfar for her
editorial prowess, and to Andrew Siegel, for his input, feedback, and unflagging moral
support.
1 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
2 For the purposes of this Note, and unless otherwise indicated, "custodial" eligibility
and "custody" determinations involve determinations of parental primary custody, joint
custody, and visitation rights.
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utes now single out parents convicted or accused of selected crimes
and apply new presumptions and prohibitions against them. In many
jurisdictions, persons who commit these crimes, even upon completion
of their sentences, become presumptively unfit under the law to raise
children.
This phenomenon represents something more than a change in
American custody law. It also constitutes an important new form of
"civil branding": criminal sanctions imposed as much for their com-
municative effect as for the policy aims they achieve.3 When a par-
3 "Othering" is the process by which a society defines what is "normal" through the
use of counterexamples, creating a binarism in which the "normal" depends on the "other"
for its normalcy. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, discussing the creation of a binarism in the sex-
ual orientation context, provides an excellent narrative of the othering process. She de-
scribes it in terms of:
symmetrical binary oppositions .. according to which, first, term B is not
symmetrical with but subordinated to term A; but, second, the ontologically
valorized term A actually depends for its meaning on the simultaneous sub-
sumption and exclusion of term B; hence, third, the question of priority be-
tween the supposed central and the supposed marginal category of each dyad
is irresolvably unstable, an instability caused by the fact that term B is consti-
tuted as at once internal and external to term A.
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet 9-10 (1990). Othering, furthermore,
portrays the traits that distinguish the "other" as a constitutive part of the person's iden-
tity, rather than as narrower character traits or isolated actions.
An extensive literature explains how modem Western societies have utilized this tech-
nique to order and routinize behavior. Michel Foucault, for example, argues that the mod-
em Western world has constructed the "criminal," the "insane," and the sexually
"depraved" in order to normalize persons who are not constructed as members of these
categories. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 251-56 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vin-
tage Books 1979) (1978) [hereinafter Foucault, Discipline and Punish] (discussing construc-
tion of criminally "delinquent"); Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 36 (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978) (discussing construction of persons "depraved"
or "perverse"); Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the
Age of Reason 11-12 (Richard Howard trans., Pantheon 1965) (1961) (discussing social
construction of "madness").
Foucault's methodology has played an important role in shaping the literature in the
field of criminal sanctions. See, e.g., Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Pol-
icy 414 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1998) [hereinafter Principled Sen-
tencing] (describing ideological importance to modem penology of drawing "[s]harp
distinctions. between ordinary, respectable persons and various 'undesirables' who sup-
posedly threaten the physical and moral health of the community"). The criminal sanc-
tions literature explicates the cultural meanings and social realities embedded in a given
society's penological practices. See, e.g., David Garland, Punishment and Modem Society:
A Study in Social Theory 251-52 (1990) ("Punishment ... is a communicative and didactic
institution .... [P]enality communicates meaning not just about crime and punishment but
also about power, authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, [and] social rela-
tions .... ."); Thomas Mathiesen, Prison on Trial: A Critical Assessment 137 (1990) (study-
ing the "important ideological functions" prison serves "in advanced welfare-state
capitalist societies"); see also Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra, at 23 (describing his
study of modem prison as investigation into "punishment as a complex social function"
and describing punishment as "a political tactic").
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ent's criminal actions represent a genuine danger to his or her child,
the "best interest of the child" standard gives such actions their due
weight. To the extent that new rules are aimed at such cases, they are
duplicative. To the extent that they are directed at situations in which
the parent poses no threat to the child, they are pernicious. What they
have in common in all situations is that they reflect a societal need to
mark those who have transgressed social boundaries as "other." As
scholars have observed in the context of other criminal sanctions, "the
convicted offender is excluded from the moral universe of discourse,
and is made to serve merely as the object of and conduit for public
messages of denunciation."4 By denying a person who commits a
crime custody of a child, society reinforces his or her status as a
"criminal."
Concededly, there never may have been a time when persons
convicted of crimes5 emerged from prison purged of sin and restored
to full citizenship.6 In practice, criminal convictions always may have
tainted an individual's character in the eyes of society, and that taint
never may have been eradicated by having been "cured" or by having
paid a "debt to society." Nevertheless, the formalization of such op-
probrium in law, particularly in the area of child custody and family
formation, is a recent development. During the same period in which
federal sentencing guidelines and state criminal laws have increased
the length of time convicted persons spend imprisoned, jurisdictions
increasingly have imposed additional civil sanctions on persons con-
victed of offenses.7 Further, courts now modify the custodial rights of
persons who may have engaged in criminal behavior, but who never
have been convicted in criminal court.8 The penalty paid by persons
who break the law now complements increased time behind bars with
increased post-release shunning by civil society. Assuming that the
4 Principled Sentencing, supra note 3, at 416.
5 This Note will refer to persons who have pleaded guilty to crimes, been found guilty
at trial, or otherwise been found to have engaged in criminal activity as "persons convicted
of sexual offenses" or "persons who have committed sexual offenses" rather than as "sex-
ual offenders." The purpose of this Note is to indicate the extent to which an individual's
"status" as a person who has perpetrated or been convicted of a crime now follos them
into civil life and marks their civic identity. This Note will thus avoid referring to such
persons by a shorthand designation that suggests that their convicted status comprises their
identity.
6 See infra Part I.A.
7 This Note does not address the issue of whether civil sentencing alternatives are
preferable to imprisonment; thoughtful critiques of current prisons as failed institutions are
numerous. See, e.g., Roy D. King, Prisons, in The Handbook of Crime and Punishment
589 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). This Note focuses on civil sanctions employed in addition
to, rather than instead of, imprisonment.
8 See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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criminal justice system was once concerned with reclaiming or rehabil-
itating offenders and restoring them to their communities, our current
program of sanctions undercuts that goal.
The extent to which such persons actually are considered danger-
ous is questionable. Several factors make new laws appear to be
based less on careful consideration than on societal frustration with
criminal activity. First, courts and legislatures have focused on crimi-
nal activity rather than on similar behaviors outside of the parenting
ambit that might logically affect child rearing-for example, spending
eighteen hours each day at a law firm or exposing oneself to unneces-
sary recreational risk (such as racing cars). Second, these presump-
tions require no showing that the parent's conduct toward the child
has been deleterious, either via some objective external standard or
from testimony or psychiatric evaluation of the child involved; the in-
dividual's transgressive conduct renders him or her per se an unfit par-
ent. Finally, the particular crimes singled out through legislation and
adjudication seem to be crimes that-sometimes appropriately, some-
times not-carry harsh social stigma. Sexual violence, "drug culture"
involvement, and abuse of romantic partners are crimes that-in con-
trast with armed robbery, stranger assault, or insider trading-carry
moral taint beyond the transgression of criminal statutes.
Ironically, family formation is one of the few factors that signifi-
cantly affects the recidivism rates of persons who commit crimes; fa-
milial stability both provides a social network whereby persons can
access housing, employment, and emotional support, and offers a dis-
incentive for recidivism. 9 When parents are constructed as criminal
for the purposes of awarding custody, this determination does two
things: First, it offers an additional punishment to the marked parents,
multiplying whatever social sanction inheres in the criminal statute by
civil sanctions not contemplated by the criminal code. Beyond that, it
makes it less likely that parents will ever be able to reintegrate into
society and reform.
These measures are of particular concern because of the popula-
tions that they affect. First, custodial presumptions generally are trig-
gered only when a family moves away from the married heterosexual
couple model and toward a position where custody is contested. Fur-
ther, women and minorities in particular are likely to come under the
scrutiny of both family courts and the criminal justice system: During
9 See Stephanie J. Millet, Note, The Age of Criminal Responsibility in an Era of Vio-
lence: Has Great Britain Set a New International Standard?, 28 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 295,
332 n.241 (1995) ("Most studies show that family contact helps to reduce recidivism
rates.").
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the past twenty-five years, arrest and incarceration rates for women 10
and minorities1 have increased relative to those of white men. Much
of this growth is attributable to increased prosecution and incarcera-
tion of nonviolent persons who use or sell drugs.12 Further, as women
who do commit acts of violence are more likely than men to commit
those acts against relatives or partners, 3 presumptions against child
custody for persons who assault intimates may particularly affect
women.14
10 See Kate DeCou, U.S. Social Policy on Prostitution: Whose Welfare is Served?, 24
New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 427, 442-43 (1998) (arguing that "getting tough
on crime" movement and related criminal justice changes are responsible for increased
incarceration of women); Paula C. Johnson, At the Intersection of Injustice: Experiences
of African American Women in Crime and Sentencing, 4 Am. U. J. Gender & L 1, 43-44
(1995) (finding that number of women in New York state prisons increased significantly
during 1980s); Lorraine Schmall, Forgiving Guin Garcia: Women, the Death Penalty and
Commutation, 11 Wis. Women's L.J. 283,300 (1996) (describing women as fastest-growing
segment of prison population, with their presence rising 75% from 19S6 to 1991).
11 See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 546 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1994) (noting that African Ameri-
can men represented 49% of state prison population and 33.7% of federal prisoners); Marc
Mauer, Intended and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprison-
ment (The Sentencing Project, 1997) <http://wvw.senteneingproject.org/polcyi9O5O.htm>
(finding that 38 states and District of Columbia increased racial disparity in their incarcera-
tion rates from 1988 to 1994, and that rate of incarceration for blacks in state prisons-
compared to rate for whites-increased from 6.88 times to 7.66 times more).
12 See Cynthia Godsoe, The Ban on Welfare for Felony Drug Offenders: Giving a New
Meaning to "Life Sentence," 13 Berkeley Women's LJ. 257, 261 (1998) (noting that, in
California, 39.7% of women are in prison for drug-related offenses, and incarceration rate
for black women has been particularly high); Honorable Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 439, 494 n.296 (1999) ("'In recent years, women, particularly women arrested on
drug charges, have constituted the fastest growing population within the criminal justice
system.'" (quoting Jean Wellisch et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug-Abusing V/omen Of-
fenders: Results of National Survey 1-6 (1994))); Johnson, supra note 10, at 44 (noting that
in New York state prisons 61.2% of women, versus 32.2% of men, were incarcerated for
drug offenses, and that incarceration rate was rising faster for women than for men);
Mauer, supra note 11 (finding that number of African Americans imprisoned for drug
offenses from 1986 to 1991 increased 465.5%, and that increase in number of convicted
black drug offenders "far outpaced" white rate).
13 See Schmall, supra note 10, at 301 ("When women are violent, their violence is usu-
ally directed against a family member. Data from 1991 showed that, nationwide, one-quar-
ter of the women in prison for violent crimes were convicted of the homicide of a relative
or an intimate.").
14 A large number of incarcerated women either are currently mothers or enter prison
pregnant. See Catherine Conly, The Women's Prison Association: Supporting Women Of-
fenders and Their Families 3-4 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice Program Focus 1998) <bttpi//%,lw.
ncjrs.org/pdfflesI172858.pdf> (finding that dramatic rise occurred in number of women in
federal and state prison and that, in 1991, six percent of women were pregnant when they
became incarcerated).
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Past articles have located the discussion of these new custody
measures in the policy literature: Advocates argue for presumptions
against and prohibitions on persons convicted of crime by asserting
that fewer children will be abused as a result.15 This Note, however,
interprets these civil laws through the lens of the criminal sanctions
literature.16 To understand the social meaning of this new sanction,
this Note takes an expressly historical approach. Part I describes both
the various sanctioning regimes that have at one time or another dom-
inated in the United States and the modem phenomenon of attaching
civil sanctions to criminal convictions and sentences. This Part dem-
onstrates how, over time, persons who commit crimes have been
transformed in their social construction, and now are constructed as
intrinsically and irredeemably criminal. Part II focuses in detail on
recent developments in civil sanctions relating to the ability of con-
victed persons, or persons suspected of crimes, to form or remain in
families with children, and reviews legislation and case law in the ar-
eas of domestic violence, sexual offenses, and drug-related felonies.
Reading these cases and laws with appreciation for both their histori-
cal roots and their cultural connotations, their gaps, silences, and repe-
titions, speak volumes. Whatever other policy goals they serve,
custodial prohibitions now function to mark permanently those who
transgress the law. Marked once as criminal, the parent serves for life.
I
THE (RE)EMERGENCE OF CML BRANDING
Historically, persons in the United States who transgressed crimi-
nal law were socially marked so that community members could them-
selves regulate the social environment and contain crime. 17 After two
centuries of increasing dependence on the penitentiary as both a
means for segregation and a site for treatment and rehabilitation,
criminal law has come full circle: Persons committing crimes are again
socially identified outside of a correctional setting.18 This Part de-
scribes the history of criminal sanction in the United States and the
modern trends toward lengthy, fixed sentences, retribution-based jus-
tice, and civil branding. These modem trends provide context for in-
creased modem regulation of the custodial relationships of adults who
have violated criminal laws. Within this context, new prohibitions can
15 See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
16 For a discussion of the goals and methods of the criminal sanctions literature, see
supra note 3.
17 See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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be understood as an indication that, once again, we view "criminality"
as an innate quality.
A. A History of Sanction
At its inception, American criminal justice did not place prisons
or the notion of retribution at the center of its system of punishment.19
Crime was initially understood as a phenomenon produced by original
sin and innate human flaws, one with which society need cope and
manage, but which society could not cure.20 Colonial America con-
structed criminals not as societal outcasts but as ordinary sinners;
crime was not stigmatized as evidence of poor character, as it more
closely resembled being struck by lightning than suffering from a
moral failing.21 Crime was checked by community suspicion and regu-
lation; colonial citizens figuratively and literally policed the bounda-
ries between insiders and outsiders, community residents and
nonresidents.=2 Punishment for major offenses was death; for minor
offenses, community shaming, fines, and banishment.2 Jails were
used to hold persons pending resolution of their criminal cases, rather
than as sites for punishment 24 The purpose of noncapital criminal
sanction was not segregation and demarcation of a criminal class;
rather, criminal law reintegrated those who had violated criminal law
back into society.25 The colonial conception of criminals, in other
words, centered on community-based sanctions of community mem-
bers, designed to restore persons convicted of crime to their original
community status.
19 See David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in The Ox-
ford History of the Prison 100, 101 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1993) ("The
most popular sanctions included fines, whippings, mechanisms of shame (the stock and
public cage), banishment, and of course, the gallows. What was not on the list was
imprisonment.").
20 See id. at 101 ("From [the] perspective [of colonial Americans], crime reflected on
the human condition and failings-men were born in sin-and not on any basic fla%s in
social order.").
21 While the criminal status of individuals was noted for the purpose of policing behav-
ior, the stigma of criminal activity was not permanent. See William E. Nelson, Americani-
zation of the Common Law- The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-
1830, at 39 (1994) ("Like sin, crime could strike in any man's family or among any man's
neighbors.").
22 See Rothman, supra note 19, at 101 (noting that major aim of colonial American
crime control policy was to maintain "a careful distinction between insiders and outsiders,
town residents and nonresidents").
23 See id.
24 See id.; see also Nelson, supra note 21, at 40 (noting few instances of imprisonment
for more than one year between 1760 and 1774).
25 See Nelson, supra note 21, at 40.
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Industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and population
growth meant communities had more difficulty self-policing. By the
1820s and 1830s, the prison developed as the central site for the insti-
tutional rehabilitation communities could no longer perform effec-
tively.26 Convicts were not yet viewed as inherently depraved. Rather
than suffering from original sin, offenders were viewed as victims of
upbringings that had failed to shelter them from societal vices and as
susceptible to contact with corruption.27 The souls of prisoners were
to be reclaimed and uplifted; retribution was not an acceptable goal of
sanction.28 Penitentiaries segregated offenders from corruption
outside prison walls; within prisons, as well, prisoners generally were
isolated from the temptations of one another.29 In isolation, prisoners
reflected on their errors and relearned social virtues.30 The assump-
tion of the penitentiary was, however, that these virtues would indeed
be reinculcated and souls reclaimed on a fixed timetable.31 As in the
colonial era, convicted persons who had completed their punishment
had fulfilled the requirements for reintegration into society.
By the early twentieth century, however, convicted persons were
no longer constructed as bereft of inculcated community values, but as
clinically sick and in need of cure.32 Progressives considered crime
26 See Adam J. Hirsch, The Rise of the Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early
America 114 (1992) (noting that development of penitentiary should be viewed in light of
"social context in which it was offered-namely, growing criminal anonymity, failing public
punishments, and rampant property crime, particularly in urban centers and ports"); see
also Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 155 (1993) (dis-
cussing rise of penitentiary); Rothman, supra note 19, at 106 ("The shared assumption was
that since the convict was not innately depraved but had failed to be trained to obedience
by family, church, school, or community, he could be redeemed by the well-ordered rou-
tine of the prison.").
27 See David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in
the New Republic 82-84 (1971) (demonstrating commitment of early prison designers to
reclamation model whereby routines imposed on inmate would transform him into law-
abiding citizen). Jacksonian Americans idealized their forefathers' world as one comprised
of peaceful, cohesive communities lacking in social strain, conditions that prisons could
recreate. See id. at 108.
28 See Hirsch, supra note 26, at 18, 19, 113.
29 See Rothman, supra note 27, at 85 ("[S]eparated from evil society.., the progress of
corruption is arrested." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30 See id. at 83-84 (stating idea that isolation would encourage moral reform both inside
and outside prisons); see also Hirsch, supra note 26, at 18 (explaining that prisons had goal
"not only of deterring others from the Commission of the like Crimes, but also of re-
forming the Individuals, and inuring them to Habits of Industry" (quoting Penitentiary
Act, 1779, 19 Geo. 3, ch. 74, § 5 (Eng.))).
31 See Adrian Howe, Punish and Critique: Towards a Feminist Analysis of Penality 86
(1994) (discussing Foucault's description of penal law in 1837 as timetabled form of
punishment).
32 See Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in The Ox-
ford History of the Prison, supra note 19, at 151, 151 ("By the opening decades of the
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amenable to a social science approach, where the "facts" of each con-
victed person's case and conduct could be analyzed and managed in a
systematic fashion 3 3 Persons violating the criminal law would be iso-
lated and treated until safely-restorable to society; persons who could
not be so restored would be segregated indefinitely? 4 Punishment
thus became individualized and approached through indeterminate
prison sentences, probation, and parole. Despite these more flexible
sanctions, however, the aim of progressives was not necessarily to re-
turn more offenders to the community.3 5 Rather, the individualized
approach suggested a shift from the view of social reintegration em-
braced in both the colonial era and the early days of the penitentiary.
While earlier periods accepted convicted persons back into society at
a specified time on the assumption that their souls had been reformed,
Progressives accepted convicted persons only once satisfied that their
souls had indeed reformed. The indeterminate sentences and individ-
ualized rehabilitative treatment of persons convicted of criminal of-
fenses continued as the focus of the penal system through the social
program heyday of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, when frustra-
tion with crime, combined with a variety of other social factors, re-
shaped the model of criminal sanctions from rehabilitation to
punishment.36
B. Modem Criminal Justice
The modem trend toward getting tough on crime is well docu-
mented.3 7 More persons are convicted,38 more persons convicted are
twentieth century, a frankly therapeutic model was in effect: offenders were 'sick' and
were to be 'cured' of their criminality in a setting that approximated, as far as possible, a
normal society."). Note that the environment in which a cure was to be effected vas "a
setting that approximated, as far as possible, a normal society." Id.
33 See David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alterna-
tives in Progressive America 46 (1980).
34 See, e.g., The Positive School of Criminology. Three Lectures by Enrico Ferri 102
(Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1968) (discussing utility of indeterminate sentences in context of
rehabilitation model).
35 See id. (arguing that indeterminate sentences were often used to inoculate society by
imprisoning dangerous persons indefinitely).
36 See generally Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal 29-30 (1931);
Marvin Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 Wayne L Rev. 45,
84-88 (1977).
37 See Elliott Currie, Crime and Punishment in the United States: Myths, Realities,
and Possibilities, in The Politics of Law- A Progressive Critique 381,382 (David Kairys ed.,
1998) (noting trends toward prison labor, three-strikes-and-you're-out, and public shaming,
and public perception of source of crime as "moral and cultural"). The implementation of
federal and state sentencing guidelines, in particular, responded to both popular pressure
for less lenient criminal justice and academic pressure to reduce the unjust disparity in
sentencing policies. See Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present, in The
Oxford History of the Prison, supra note 19, at 202, 217. While in the 1960s legislatures
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serving time,39 and they are serving more time.40 As more persons
enter prison and stay in prison longer, however, there is no concomi-
tant growth in either prison-based or community-based programs to
reintroduce or readapt persons released into society.41 The criminal
sanctions literature views this law and order phenomenon critically: It
views the "get tough on crime" movement as motivated by fear and
detached from traditional penological purposes such as deterrence
and rehabilitation. 42
Civil strictures recently enacted against persons convicted of
crimes continue a century's worth of legal development.4 3 For exam-
ple, persons convicted of drug-related felonies may now be barred
traditionally set maximum, but not minimum, sentences for persons convicted, by the early
1990s judges in many cases no longer had the discretion to determine either when a prison
sentence would be imposed or how long the duration of the sentence would be. See id. at
218.
38 The United States now holds a record 1.8 million persons in prison-more people
than does any other nation. See Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, Atlantic
Monthly, Dec. 1998, at 51, 52. As of 1995, the U.S. incarceration rate is second only to that
of Russia as the highest in the world. See Currie, supra note 37, at 384. Of persons in
custody, 100,000 are held in federal prison, 1.1 million in state prison, and 600,000 in localjails. See Schlosser, supra, at 52. The trend toward high levels of incarceration is recent.
From the beginning of the century through the 1970s, the incarceration rate held steady at
about 0.11%, then doubled in the 1980s, and again in the 1990s. The level is now between
0.445% and 0.6%. See id. Approximately 1,000 new prisons were constructed in the past
20 years. In New York, for example, Governor Mario Cuomo funded more new prison
beds than all the state's previous governors combined. See Schlosser, supra, at 56.
Notably, the proportion of incarcerated, nonviolent persons has also increased. In
1980, half of state prisoners had been convicted of violent crimes; by 1995, less than a third
of state prisoners served time for violent offenses. See Nicholas Confessore, Prisoner
Proliferation, Am. Prospect, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 69.
39 After the implementation of minimum sentences in both federal and state criminal
law, more convicted offenders were selected for prison. See Morris, supra note 37, at 216.
40 In addition to providing statutory minimum sentences for persons convicted and
eliminating the discretion of judges to set sentence lengths, sentencing reforms have also
reduced the discretion of parole releasing authorities. See id. at 218.
41 See id. (recognizing lack of such post-release programs); see also Gordon Lafer,
Captive Labor: America's Prisoners as Corporate Workforce, Am. Prospect, Sept.-Oct.
1999, at 66, 68 (noting that expenditures for training and education in prison have been
declining and that prison-based work programs tend to employ prisoners already possess-
ing required skills rather than train prisoners in new skills).
42 See generally Principled Sentencing, supra note 3, at 410-23.
43 See, e.g., Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives & Peggy S. Blotner, Loss and Restora-
tion of Civil Rights Affecting Disqualification for Federal Jury Service, 70 Mich. BJ. 542,
543 (1991) (describing process by which potential jurors may be barred from jury service
based on convictions); Steffanie Stracke, Comment, The Criminal Activity Forfeiture Act:
Replete with Constitutional Violations, 57 Mo. L. Rev. 909, 910 (1992) (arguing that crimi-
nal activity forfeiture is used by law-enforcement agencies as "strong arm" tactic). There is
also literature concerning reliance on formal community-based sanctions. See, e.g.,
Anthony E. Bottoms, Neglected Features of Contemporary Penal Systems, in The Power
to Punish: Contemporary Penality and Social Analysis 166, 174-75 (David Garland &
Peter Young eds., 1983) (discussing growing phenomenon of community-based penalties).
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from receiving public benefits.44 Federal laws bar those convicted of
felony offenses or domestic violence misdemeanors from owning or
possessing handguns. 45 In several jurisdictions, persons convicted of
felonies cannot vote46 or hold public office.47 Prior felony convictions
increasingly are used as grounds for deporting aliens, often without
traditional due process protections.48 Incarceration itself is used both
44 See Godsoe, supra note 12, at 257.
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994 & Supp. 11 1998). Interestingly, a three-judge panel of
the D.C. Circuit unanimously invalidated federal domestic violence misdemeanor prohibi-
tions on handgun possession on equal protection grounds because the statute in question
failed to include certain exceptions applicable under the federal felony handgun ban, nota-
bly those for police officers and military officials. See Fraternal Order of Police v. United
States, 152 F.3d 998, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev'd, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 324 (1999). This failure created the "irrational" result that persons con-
victed of domestic violence felonies could retain positions as police officers or armed serv-
ices officials while those convicted of misdemeanors would be required to give up their
jobs. See id. On rehearing, the panel reversed, holding that rational basis review vras
satisfied because a reasonable Congress could have believed that persons convicted of do-
mestic violence felonies were already subject to sufficient sanctions. See Fraternal Order of
Police, 173 F3d at 903-04.
As this Note argues in a different context, the illogical crafting of the statutes impli-
cated in Fraternal Order of Police suggests that legislative provisions regarding collateral
civil consequences are often created as political responses to public crises, rather than as
statutes actually intended to reduce crime or to adopt a sensible criminal code. See gener-
ally Major Einwechter & Captain Christiansen, Abuse Your Spouse and Lose Your Job:
Federal Law Now Prohibits Some Soldiers from Possessing Military Weapons, Army Law.,
Aug. 1997, at 25.
46 See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24,56 (1974) (upholding as constitutional
voting restrictions based on status as convicted felon). The Sentencing Project has found
that 3.9 million Americans, including 13% of black men (25% in the seven states vhich
disenfranchise convicted felons), have been stripped of voting rights based on their status
as convicted felons. See Summary, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchise-
ment Laws in the United States (Sentencing Project Policy Report No. 900, 1993) <http.//
www.sentencingproject.orgpolicy/9080.htmn>. According to Marc Mauer, assistant director
of the Sentencing Project, this is the highest disenfranchisement rate among democratic
nations. See Clyde Haberman, Filtering Out Taint of Bias from the Law, N.Y. Tmes, Jan.
28, 2000, at B1. Mauer notes that "unnecessary policies such as the felony voting restric-
tions serve only to communicate a message of exclusion from the political process." Id.
47 See, e.g., Swan v. LaFollette, 605 N.W.2d 640 (Vis. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding AVIs-
consin law prohibiting persons convicted of felonies from holding public office).
48 See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Las and the Due Pro-
cess Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 160-61 (1998) (suggesting that retroactively applying
recent deportation statutes may offend substantive due process rights); Iris Bennett, Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggraviated Fel-
ony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696,1699 (1999) (noting that passage of new statutes
increases risk of deportation for noncitizens convicted of "aggravated felonies"). Employ-
ers also more informally use previous convictions to deny employment to job applicants.
See, e.g., Bruce E. May, The Character Component of Occupational Licensing Laws: A
Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon's Employment Opportunities, 71 N.D. L Rev. 187,188
(1995) ("State occupational licensing laws can operate to reduce the availability of employ-
ment opportunities for ex-felons.").
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in statutes and in common law determinations to terminate the child
custody of incarcerated parents.49
Civil sanctions attached to persons convicted of criminal offenses
can be viewed as additional criminal sanctions. Historically, formal
civil penalties have been largely political; in many states, convicted
felons may not, for example, vote or serve on juries.50 Modem penal-
ties, however, are intended to operate as prophylactics.5 1 Disen-
franchisement, a political sanction, represents an attempt to prevent
convicted felons from fully participating in society; in contrast,
Megan's Law,52 for example, is at least nominally designed to prevent
convicted child molesters from seeking new victims.5 3 Similarly, fed-
49 See generally Jean M. Johnson & Christa N. Flowers, You Can Never Go Home
Again: The Florida Legislature Adds Incarceration to the List of Statutory Grounds for
Termination of Parental Rights, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 335 (1998) (examining Florida law
making incarceration statutory ground for terminating parental rights); Philip J. Prygoski,
When a Hearing Is Not a Hearing: Irrebuttable Presumptions and Termination of Parental
Rights Based on Statutes, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 879, 880-900 (1983) (reviewing statutes and
case law that make incarceration basis for termination of parental rights); Steven Fleischer,
Note, Termination of Parental Rights: An Additional Sentence for Incarcerated Parents,
29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 312 (1998) (reviewing and critiquing such statutes and common law
rules). Interestingly, early prisons permitted women to keep their infants and children in
their physical custody while incarcerated. See Lucia Zedner, Wayward Sisters: The Prison
for Women, in The Oxford History of the Prison, supra note 19, at 295, 307.
50 All but three states prevent felony convicts from voting while incarcerated; 35 states
also disenfranchise persons on probation and parole; and 14 states disenfranchise persons
convicted of felonies for life. See Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disen-
franchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537, 538-39
(1993); see also Komives & Blotner, supra note 43, at 543 (citing Mich. Ct. R. 2.511(D),
which permits consideration of felony conviction when determining qualification for jury
service).
Historically, the origin of these provisions is racial. Compare Richardson, 418 U.S. at
56 (holding legislation preventing persons convicted of felonies from voting to be constitu-
tional), with Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 231-33 (1985) (striking down Alabama
constitutional provision preventing persons convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude" from
voting because provision was enacted for racially discriminatory purpose). Cf. Baker v.
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 943 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (per curiam) (dismissing racial discrimina-
tion challenge to New York's felony disenfranchisement statute based on Voting Rights
Act). See also Shapiro, supra, at 538-39 ("Criminal disenfranchisement... was the most
subtle method of excluding blacks from the franchise.").
51 Convicted persons are currently socially "marked," arguably so that they may be
identified by community members and watched or avoided; alternatively, persons con-
victed of crimes are simply so "bad" that they do not deserve a democratic voice. It strains
credulity to suggest that convicted persons are disenfranchised in order to prevent them
from exercising their political might so as either to make the government more sympathetic
to lawbreakers or to decriminalize behavior (although it is certainly arguable that disen-
franchisement is designed to prevent a disproportionately large racial minority population
from voting). Preventing domestic violence perpetrators from owning firearms, however,
seems intended directly to prevent convicted persons from repeating past assaults.
52 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999).
53 The author does not concede that Megan's Law is a measure enacted for the purpose
of preventing the recidivism of child molesters. Since the enactment of Megan's Law and
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eral felony provisions preventing persons convicted of partner abuse
from owning handguns facially are intended to keep weapons out of
the hands of people whom the law perceives might use them.54 Inher-
ent in such prophylactic measures is the notion that once convicted
criminals are released from prison, they are likely either to repeat
their crime or commit new offenses. Prison is not viewed as an institu-
tion capable of reforming convicted persons.
The Megan's Law rationale, however, cannot justify domestic vio-
lence law on a prophylactic theory. Persons who abuse one partner
must be assumed-or must be assumed to be likely-to abuse either
their children or subsequent sexual partners as well. This argument
reaches a breaking point with persons convicted of either sexual of-
fenses against or with other adults or of drug-related crimes. While it
is possible (albeit unlikely) that legislators and judges believe that
they are protecting children from sexually predatory parents or guard-
ians who will entice them to ingest or sell illegal substances, the most
reasonable reading of these statutes is that they assume that the sorts
of individuals who would sexually assault other persons or traffic in
drugs also will be ineffective parents.55
The modem view appears to be that crime is an ineradicable part
of the human condition-incurable and unrehabilitatable. Principles
of retribution formerly eschewed by penologists and philosophers en-
joy a growing base of academic and political support; the notion of
rehabilitation as an explicit policy goal largely has been abandoned 6
Notably, the federal sentencing guidelines represent an abandonment
of the principles of rehabilitation and individualizationP At the same
similar provisions in several states, there has emerged a rich literature concerning the regis-
tration of persons convicted of sexual offenses which, using an analysis similar to that em-
ployed by this Note, suggests that Megan's Law is more about marking persons convicted
and continuing their punishment after release than about protecting the community from
future harms. For an examination of the effectiveness and constitutionality of child sex
offender registration laws, see generally Michele L Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender
Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended Results Asso-
ciated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 788 (1996); Joel B.
Rudin, Megan's Law- Can it Stop Sexual Predators-And at What Cost to Constitutional
Rights?, Crim. Just., Fall 1996, at 3.
54 See supra note 45.
55 See infra parts ILB and ILC.
56 See generally Susan Jacoby, Wild Justice: The Evolution of Revenge (1983) (de-
scribing criminal justice as necessarily including element of controlled vengeance); Jean
Hampton, A New Theory of Retribution, in Liability and Responsibility 377 (R.G. Frey &
Christopher WV. Morris eds., 1991) (articulating theory of retribution based on compensat-
ing victims for degradation in worth).
57 The federal sentencing guidelines replace judicial discretion in sentencing with a grid
that places persons convicted of crimes on a matrix according to their criminal history and
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time, shaming punishments are enjoying a renaissance. 58 Whereas
community sanctions might once have served a useful or valid pur-
pose, the use of these sanctions makes less sense in a modem context.
Shaming punishments originally were abandoned because communi-
ties had grown too large and loose to self regulate;59 communities
have not, in the past two centuries, grown smaller and more cohesive.
While some individuals who support increased civil sanctions un-
doubtedly are motivated by a belief that community-based sanctions
deter or prevent crime, another motivating force lurks behind the gen-
eral policy direction recently adopted. Individuals have transgressed
the criminal law, and, as such, have shown themselves to be "other,"
deserving identification and demarcation. Punishment-either in the
(modem) traditional form of incarceration or in the form of civil sanc-
tions-can be understood as a form of moral communication, expres-
sing social condemnation of a morally grave offense. Civil sanctions
such as those described in this Note convey that this message is per-
manent, and the offense sufficiently morally grave to mark individuals
for life and prevent them from engaging in the act of parenting.60
II
MODERN LEGISLATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST CUSTODY FOR PERSONS
COMMIrTING CRIMINAL OFFENSES
Demarcation of persons convicted of crimes includes termination
of or prohibitions on child custody. The designation of such persons
as presumptively unfit contrasts sharply with the general shift away
from presumptions in child custody determinations. Where custody
law once perceived parents as fit or unfit based on status, the "best
interest of the child" statute now governs child custody and looks only
to the relationship between parent and child.61
Courts historically awarded custody to fathers, the assumed prov-
iders and heads of family; fathers were deprived of custody only if
the level of their convicted offense. See generally U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(1995).
58 See generally Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 733 (1998) (discussing shaming model of punishment and its prevalence); Toni M.
Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y &
L. 645 (1997) (describing recent emergence of interest in shaming).
59 See Hirsch, supra note 26.
60 See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in Doing and Deserving
95, 98 (1970) (describing expressive function of punishment).
61 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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found extraordinarily unfit.62 During the early nineteenth century,
however, courts began to award custody to both mothers and fathers,
generally preferring the party not found at fault for the divorce.63
During the course of the nineteenth century, the custodial presump-
tion shifted to mothers, whom courts characterized as nurturing, car-
ing, and based at home.64 Maternal preference dovetailed with a
"tender years" presumption, favoring mothers in particular when de-
termining custodial arrangements for very young children.65
During the course of the twentieth century, however, legislatures
and courts began to focus more on the relationship between parent
and child than on the gender of the parent and its presumed constitu-
tive traits. By the mid-1970s, child custody determinations were in-
creasingly based on the discretionary "best interest of the child"
principle rather than on explicit, delineated rules .6 Most states now
statutorily require a best interest standard;67 the majority of states that
do not have statutes nevertheless employ best interest as their com-
mon law standard in making custody determinations.0 Best interest
62 See Harvey R. Sorkow, Best Interest of the Child: By Whose Definition?, 18 Pepp.
L Rev. 383, 384 (1991).
63 See Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard. A Comparison of the State's
Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Chil-
dren and Incompetent Patients, 7 Issues L. & Med. 283, 293 (1991).
64 See Sorkow, supra note 62, at 384.
65 Some states continue to consider the child's age as a factor when making custody
determinations. See generally Barbara Ehrenreich & Dierdre English, For Her Om
Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women (1978); Michael Grossberg, Governing
the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America 239-41 (1985).
66 See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226,227 (1975).
67 See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 855,863-64
(1999) ("The typical [child custody] statute directs that custody decisions be made accord-
ing to the child's best interests."). One recent commentator listed statutes from 45 states
adopting the best interest standard. See Amy B. Levin, Comment, Child Witnesses of
Domestic Violence: How Should Judges Apply the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
Custody and Visitation Cases Involving Domestic Violence?, 47 UCLA L Rev. 813, 820
n.5 (2000) (listing statutes). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act requires that:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody,
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or
parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community
, 
and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child.
Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
68 See Mnookin, supra note 66, at 236-37.
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statutes are generally quite vague, listing a short set of criteria directly
relating to the relationship between the child and his or her parents.69
Most importantly, these statutes explicitly contain provisions prohibit-
ing the consideration of parental behavior that does not affect the par-
ent's relationship to the child.70
These best interest standards only recently have begun to include
specific presumptions against parents with criminal convictions or re-
ported criminal activity. 71 These presumptions conceivably implicate
the parent/child relationship;72 parents who abuse their partner, en-
gage in criminal sexual activity, or are involved in the drug trade may
poorly model acceptable adult behavior. Best interest standards may
have been intended to remove from judicial review behavior that
might be classified as immoral but not illegal: adultery or cohabita-
tion, for example.73 If these statutes really are intended to confine
court review to the interaction between parent and child, however,
this distinction seems less meaningful. As this Part will argue, the as-
sumption that illegal activity equals poor parenting collapses the iden-
tity of implicated individuals into one that is criminal, "other," and
dangerous.
The crimes to which presumptions against custody or prohibitions
against family formation attach generally have been crimes containing
an element of moral taint, an observation that lends additional
credence to the argument that new child custody law is more about
punishing parents than protecting children. No child custody statutes
69 The absence of more detailed, demanding, or categorical statutory and common law
rules in child custody determinations does not imply that these determinations are free
from implicit biases. Indeterminate rules may permit courts to regulate custodial relation-
ships without needing to provide adequate justification for their decisions. Indefinite rules
also fail to put parties on notice so that either they may prospectively satisfy implicit legal
requirements or address these requirements during litigation. See id. at 262-63. Further-
more, legislators are not always forthright with their motivations for enacting child custody
statutes. See John E. Coons et al., Deciding What's Best for Children, 7 Notre Dame J.L.
Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 465, 465-66 (1993).
70 See, e.g., Unif. Marriage & Divorce Act § 402 ("The court shall not consider conduct
of a proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child.").
71 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
72 See supra Part I.B.
73 In Clear v. Clear, for example, the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that a
mother's topless dancing career, absent evidence that the dancing adversely affected her
parenting ability, was not a relevant consideration to a custody determination. See 500
S.E.2d 790, 792 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998). The court specifically argued that "some may con-
sider Mother's occupation, though legal, immoral. Nonetheless, the effect that a parent's
morality may have on his or her fitness to have custody is limited to what relevancy it has,
either directly or indirectly, to the welfare of the child." Id. The court further noted that,
while it might not approve of topless dancing mothers, "[ilt is not necessary for the court to
make a moral judgment on a parent's lifestyle absent evidence that the lifestyle adversely
affects the welfare of the child." Id. at 792.
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explicitly enumerate the violent crimes of murder or assault as per se
barriers to childrearing, despite the equivalent violence inherent in as-
saulting a stranger and assaulting one's spouse.74 Moreover, as this
Part illustrates, specific crimes of equivalent or lesser violence have
constrained the ability of offending persons to form families with chil-
dren. 75 Further, courts that consider custody cases in the absence of
such statutes seem to attach less concern and constraint to individuals
convicted of violent crimes that do not include a specific sort of moral
taint.7 6 What unifies all of these laws and findings, however, is a focus
on criminal activity; the fact that parents have committed criminal
acts, in front of their children or not, violent or not, triggers the as-
sumption that they are unfit.
The strength of empirical and logical justifications for statutory
and common law custody proscriptions vary according to the proscrip-
tion in question: Gay parents offer an easier case than men who bat-
ter their wives, and persons who lose their children because they use
marijuana seem more sympathetic than habitual child molesters who
lose theirs. Finally, it should be noted that, while no legislative history
suggests that legislatures or courts have taken account of the potential
effects losing custody has on parents, 7 social science data uniformly
supports the fact that family contact reduces recidivism.7 s This Note
highlights the extent to which an undercurrent of animus or assump-
74 See infra Part HE.A.
75 In California, the legislative history behind the state's presumption against custody
for persons convicted of sexual offenses refers to the state's other custodial presumption
against parents who use or abuse drugs and alcohoh
According to the author, this bill is necessary to provide critical information to
parents when the court determines that granting custody or unsupervised visi-
tation to a sex offender or a person who has been convicted of certain crimes
against a child would not pose a significant risk to the child.
The author comments that the Legislature recently recognized the impor-
tance of such findings by passing into law AB 200 ... [which] required the
court to make such findings when granting sole or joint custody to a parent
who is alleged to have either a history of abuse or to be a habitual user of
controlled substances or alcohol.
Custody and Visitation Orders: Hearing on A.B. 1645 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998), available in Westlaw, CCA database. In New
York State, however, while the best interest standard does not incorporate nonsexual vio-
lent crimes, the adoption statute does. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 378-a(2)(e) (Consol.
Supp. 2000).
76 See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 113 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (affirming custody
award to father previously convicted of first-degree murder, theft, and robbery).
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 13,881 (1994) (appropriating federal funds to Family Unity Demon-
stration Project whose purpose is to evaluate whether certain demonstration projects "re-
duce recidivism rates of prisoners by encouraging strong and supportive family
relationships").
78 See Millet, supra note 9, at 332 n.241.
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tion runs through these new laws. Taken as a body, these laws signal
that, as a society, our attitudes toward persons who commit certain
criminal offenses have shifted to the point that we believe that they
are incapable of reform and are inherently dangerous to children.
A. Domestic Violence
Domestic violence, appropriately, has received extensive atten-
tion over the past fifteen years as a public policy, public health, and
criminal justice issue.79 Persons80 who physically abuse their partners
are now subject to an array of criminal and civil penalties for acts that
formerly were accepted as inevitable occurrences within romantic re-
lationships.81 People who abuse their partners may face prison and
parole; they may be subject to civil suit for violating the victims' civil
rights; they may lose their entitlement to bear arms.82 Now, in several
states, they may also lose their children.
During the past fifteen years, several states have implemented
legislative provisions that limit the ability of persons who abuse their
partners to obtain or retain custody of their children: If parents have
physically abused their co-parents, they presumptively will lose cus-
tody of common children. The trend toward enacting such presump-
tions has been dramatic and swift.83 Most states have implemented
legislative presumptions against custody for persons convicted of do-
mestic violence.84 Some of these presumptions explicitly utilize felony
79 For descriptions of the dramatic effects partner abuse has on the abused party's life,
see generally Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984).
80 Abuse in relationships is neither perpetrated only by men against women, nor is it
confined to heterosexual relationships. Social science data indicates, however, that the
most common perpetration of violence in an abusive relationship is by a male partner
against a female partner. See, e.g., Mildred Daley Pagelow, Children in Violent Families:
Direct and Indirect Victims, in Young Children and Their Families 47, 49-50 (Shirley Hill &
B.J. Barnes eds., 1982). This Note adopts gender-neutral language in discussing partner
abuse, but the heightened implications of domestic violence for women's lives should be
stressed.
81 See Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Infor-
mal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 Harv. Women's LJ. 57, 70-71 (1984); Lisa G.
Lerman et al., State Legislation on Domestic Violence, Response to Violence in Fam. &
Sexual Assault, Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 1-4, 20-26.
82 See Einwechter & Christansen, supra note 45; see also supra note 45 and accompa-
nying text (describing federal statutory prohibition against gun possession by persons con-
victed of domestic violence).
83 See Family Violence Project, Nat'l Council of Juvenile & Far. Ct. Judges, Family
Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 29
Faro. L.Q. 197, 198-99, 225-27 (1995) (listing child custody statutes incorporating domestic
violence provisions up to 1995).
84 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 705A (1999); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West
1997 & Supp. 2000); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:364(A) (West Supp. 2000); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 518.17(2)(d) (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2(1)0) (1997); Okla.
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domestic violence convictions;8 others either permit the court to use
another civil court's finding that domestic violence has occurred or
allow the court itself to determine that the partner has committed the
crime of domestic violence. 6 Presumptions may require that a party
rebut by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, for exam-
ple, "the perpetrating parent has successfully completed a treatment
program ..., is not abusing alcohol and the use of illegal drugs...,
and that the best interest of the child requires that parent's participa-
tion as a custodial parent."' 7 In total, all but two states explicitly con-
sider domestic violence against partners when making determinations
of child custody.1s
The political thrust behind laws affecting the custodial rights of
abusive partners derives from a confluence of sources, including femi-
nism8 9 and the "get tough on crime"' 9 movement. The Violence
Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 21.1(D) (West 1997); Tex. Far. Code Ann. § 153.004(c) (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.191(2) (West 1997); WIs. Stat. Ann.
§ 767.24(2)(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-113(a) (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1996).
85 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(b)(2):
Evidence that a parent has been convicted of a felony of the third degree or
higher involving domestic violence... creates a rebuttable presumption of
detriment to the child. If the presumption is not rebutted, shared parental
responsibility, including visitation, residence of the child, and decisions made
regarding the child, may not be granted to the convicted parent. However, the
convicted parent is not relieved of any obligation to provide financial support.
86 See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-062(1)(j):
If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred, and
there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily
injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of
domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, this
combination creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpe-
trated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child.
The standard of proof used in determining whether or not the parent has committed crimi-
nal domestic abuse presents an interesting issue. Nevada, for example, requires "clear and
convincing evidence" of such abuse. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.480(5) (1999). In contrast, Mas-
sachusetts adopted a "preponderance of the evidence" standard after receiving an advisory
opinion from that state's Supreme Judicial Court holding that no higher standard is consti-
tutionally required. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 691 N.E.2d 911, 917 (Mass.
1998) (stating that "preponderance of evidence" standard proposed in senate bill violated
neither state nor U.S. constitutions); see also, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209, § 38 (1999).
87 La. Rev. Stat Ann. § 9:364(A).
88 See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome
to Coercive Control, 58 Alb. L Rev. 973, 974 (1995).
89 The feminist movement views patriarchy as a force subjugating those it constructs as
weaker persons; it sees the interests of women and children, both constructed in contrast
with men, as closely bound. Within this hierarchy, tasks are gendered, with childcare
gendered as the primary female responsibility. The stakes for women in battles over cus-
tody are thus higher than those for their batterers. Further, the manner in which society
constructs motherhood is part of the reproduction of male dominance. See generally
Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering- Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of
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Against Women Act,91 adopted in 1994, marks a recognition of the
problems of domestic violence and a commitment to providing the
structure for supporting domestic violence victims. The Act has,
among other effects, spurred an increase in prosecutions of domestic
assaults,92 generating a growing body of people likely to be affected by
domestic violence presumptions. Further, while the media's grip on
society can be overstated, few events so notoriously have riveted the
public as the O.J. Simpson trial; publicity surrounding the case both
focused national attention on domestic violence and inspired a flurry
of social action, including legislative proposals to prohibit persons
who murder their co-parent from assuming child custody.93 Finally,
states have been motivated by a congressional joint resolution, passed
in 1990,94 pressing states to establish statutory presumptions "that it is
Gender 9 (1978); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract 33-35 (1988). Patriarchy encom-
passes a linked system of male domination over women and parental domination over
children; feminists have thus traditionally linked women's and children's rights in their
rhetoric and advocacy. See Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and
History of Family Violence vii (1988).
Courts do not, however, tend to consider the gender implications of domestic violence
when awarding custody. Court decisions thus treat violence committed by men and
women as equally culpable, absent any consideration of a gendered power dynamic. For
example, the North Dakota Supreme Court, reviewing a lower court custody determina-
tion, remanded the case for the following reason:
['IThe majority recites evidence which reflects domestic violence committed by
both parents. The majority then ignores the alleged violence committed by the
mother, and focuses exclusively on that of the father .... The stereotyped
assumption that all men are more powerful and violent than all women is un-
worthy of our judicial system. Participants in our legal system are entitled to
be judged as individuals, not based on stereotypes.
Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 829 (N.D. 1995) (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
90 See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
91 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
92 See Amy Waldman, Striking Back, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1998, § 14, at 1 (describing
increase in domestic violence prosecutions in Brooklyn and creation of specialized domes-
tic violence court).
93 See, e.g., Brae Canlen, I'm O.J.-You're O.J.: How the O.J. Simpson Case Has Af-
fected the Legal System, Cal. Law., Oct. 1997, at 28 ("After [Simpson's] acquittal, task
forces were appointed, committees were formed, and legislative proposals scattered like
buckshot."); Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York's Children: An Argument for the Crea-
tion of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child,
60 Alb. L. Rev. 1345, 1354 (1997) ("The high-profile O.J. Simpson murder trial was one
important factor that helped contribute to society's changing views about domestic vio-
lence .... The reality that domestic violence exists and is a severe problem that cuts across
class lines was brought into the homes of almost all Americans."). Among other proposals,
the Simpson case inspired California Assembly Bill 260, which denied a convicted domestic
partner killer custody of the couple's children. See Canlen, supra, at 30. For the version of
this bill that was ultimately adopted, see Cal. Faro. Code § 3030(c) (West Supp. 2000).
94 See H. Con. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1990) (urging that credible evidence of physical
abuse of spouse create statutory presumption that it is detrimental for child to be placed
with abuser).
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detrimental to the child to be placed in the custody of the abusive
spouse."95
There also has been a great deal of support from legal academics
for presumptions against child custody for persons who commit do-
mestic violence. A number of articles and student notes have advo-
cated implementing or expanding legislative presumptions. 96
Academic proponents of legislation denying child custody to persons
convicted of domestic violence propose three arguments concerning
the effects exposure to such persons would have on children. First,
children might experience direct, negative emotional effects from wit-
nessing domestic violence. 97 Second, children who witness domestic
violence may imitate parental behaviors once grown.98 Finally, abuse
against partners and against children may correlate predictively.99
While the social science data does not suggest that persons who abuse
their partners always or nearly always abuse their children, it is incon-
clusive on the question of whether parents who abuse their partners
95 See 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, § 1. Rather than implementing the recommended legisla-
tive presumption, New York ultimately elected to adopt legislation establishing domestic
violence as a factor for consideration in child custody proceedings "regardless of whether
the child has witnessed or has been a direct victim of the violence." Id. Note that this
legislation explicitly refuses to consider whether the parent has abused the child or com-
mitted abuse in front of the child, belying public policy rationales.
96 See generally, e.g., Kurtz, supra note 93 (arguing for statutory presumption against
custody for persons who commit domestic violence); Linda R. Keenan, Note, Domestic
Violence and Custody Litigation: 'The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 Hofstra L Rev. 407
(1985) (same).
97 See Kurtz, supra note 93, at 1350-51 (arguing that children witnessing domestic vio-
lence suffer emotional trauma, depression, anxiety, and "cognitive confusion"). Kurtz ar-
gues that child witnesses may become either excessively aggressive or overly passive. See
id. at 1352. Other studies have found some links between witnessing family violence and
child behavioral difficulties. See, e.g., Alan Rosenbaum & K. Daniel O'Leary, Children:
The Unintended Victims of Marital Violence, 51 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 692, 698 (1981)
(finding "modest association" between witnessing marital conflict and child's behavior).
Some academics have argued in favor of criminalizing exposure to domestic violence. See,
e.g., Audrey E. Stone & Rebecca J. Fialk, Criminalizing the Exposure of Children to Fam-
ily Violence: Breaking the Cycle of Abuse, 20 Harv. Women's L.J. 205, 206 (1997).
The cases cited unfavorably by proponents of legislative presumptions are compelling,
representing cases where children were psychologically damaged by the abusive father's
actions and should not have been offered to his custody. See, e.g., In re James M., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 222,229 (Ct. App. 1976) (affirming decision not to strip father of custody rights upon
his conviction for killing mother because such killing did not necessarily constitute "ne-
glect," in that "the trial court might reasonably find that the crime was a crime of passion,
not the product of a violent and vicious character, but comprehensible within the frame-
work of human folly, weakness and imperfection"). It is difficult to imagine, however, that
a best interest standard would have prompted such courts to award the father custody.
98 See Kurtz, supra note 93, at 1352 (arguing that boys who witness domestic violence
tend to abuse their partners in adulthood, while girls become victims).
99 See id.
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will be more likely to abuse their children. 10° The data problemati-
cally suggests that, where one partner abuses the other, the partners
are equally likely to abuse the child;' 0 ' if the policy justification for
100 Sociological and psychological research involving children is fraught with several dif-
ficulties. First, it is difficult to examine the long-term effects of childhood experiences on
future welfare. Second, children are generally not socially acceptable research subjects.
Finally, the family is traditionally viewed as a site for privacy, and it is often difficult to
obtain good, honest information from children embedded in family structures. See Coons
et al., supra note 69, at 479-80.
Several studies have been conducted analyzing the relationship between domestic vio-
lence against partners and child abuse. These studies indicate a correlation between do-
mestic violence against women and domestic violence against children. These studies,
however, do not establish firmly that the partner who abuses a partner also abuses a child.
See Lee H. Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in
Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse 158, 160 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds., 1988)
(reviewing literature and finding that it "does not support a solid conclusion that wife beat-
ing is a causal factor in the incidence of child abuse"); id. at 161, 163 (citing Wisconsin
study showing 41% of batterers have slapped; 16% have kicked, hit, or punched; 4% have
thoroughly beaten up; and 9% have used weapons against one or more of their children);
Evan Stark & Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective on
Child Abuse, 18 Int'l J. Health Services 97, 100 (1988) (inferring from timing of onset of
child battering by women that spousal abuse causes abused parent to batter child). See
generally Margaret Varma, Battered Women; Battered Children, in Battered Women: A
Psychosociological Study of Domestic Violence 263 (Maria Roy ed. 19717) (arguing most
adults who abuse their children were themselves battered and witnessed child and spousal
abuse). Much of the difficulty in measuring child abuse stems from the same source as the
difficulty in measuring partner abuse: incidents occur in the home, victims are reluctant to
report incidents or self-define them as abuse, and no academic or social consensus exists on
the definition of abuse. See Pagelow, supra note 80, at 50-51.
An additional difficulty with sociological analysis is that correlations between male
violence against women and household violence against children tend to mask which par-
ent perpetrates the violence against the child. Evidence suggests that, in households where
partner battering occurs, men and women are relatively equally likely physically to abuse
the household's children. See Lenore E. Walker, The Battered Woman 27 (1979) (noting
that one-third of battered women in sample abused their children, just as one-third of
battering men abused their children); see also Naomi R. Calm, Civil Images of Battered
Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 Vand. L. Rev.
1041, 1056 n.92 (1991) (citing to study that reported that in families where spousal abuse
was present, 75% of children were physically abused by father while 63% were physically
abused by mother); Einat Peled, "Secondary" Victims No More: Refocusing Intervention
with Children, in Future Interventions with Battered Women and Their Families 125, 139
(Jeffrey L. Edleson & Zvi C. Eisikovits eds., 1996) ("What is more disturbing, however, is
the tendency of most writers to minimize or even completely ignore data (and clinical
observations) regarding battered women's abusive behavior toward their children.").
There is likely some causal, sequential relationship between these patterns of abuse. This
phenomenon has been noted historically in Gordon, supra note 89, at 172.
Finally, while several state statutes explicitly do not require any showing that the child
has been physically abused or has witnessed physical abuse, and although the legislative
findings of these statutes have specifically argued that "the wealth of research demon-
strat[es] the effects of domestic violence upon children, even when the children have not
been physically abused themselves or witnessed the violence," 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, § 1,
the academic research detailed above has made no finding to this effect.
101 See Walker, supra note 100, at 27.
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statutory presumptions is prevention of child abuse, empirical data is
not necessarily supportive.
Regardless of the strength or weakness of social science data, it
does not appear to have provided the sole support for legislation link-
ing child custody and domestic violence. Academic articles, advocat-
ing presumptions themselves, suggest that outrage over the fact that
persons who batter their partners can be "rewarded" with child cus-
tody is a separate and important motivating factor for suchlegislation.102
Statutes also often contradict the state's general policies on pa-
rental conduct outside of the presence of children and the extent to
which a court is permitted to review such conduct. Colorado's statute,
for example, contains back-to-back provisions creating a presumption
against custody for persons who commit domestic violence and forbid-
ding the court from "consider[ing] conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child."1°3 States seem to
recognize in general that the conduct of parents when away from their
children is no longer considered an appropriate grounds for determin-
ing custody; °0 domestic violence presumptions, in contrast, focus on
the past conduct of one partner toward another. Finally, while the
legislative history of several statutes explicitly refers to social science
data for the proposition that the best interest of the child cannot be
served through placement in a violent household, this legislative his-
tory does not consider that the child will no longer be living in a
household with both parents; also, day-to-day custodial or visitation-
oriented transfer of a child need not involve contact between the par-
ents, as such transfer can take place through a social-worker proxy.los
102 See generally Pauline Quirion et al, Protecting Children Exposed to Domestic Vio-
lence in Contested Custody and Visitation Litigation, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. LJ. 501 (1997).
103 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-124(2) (1999). Colorado employs a "best interest of the
child" custody standard. See id. § 14-10-124.
104 See, e.g., 2 John M. Feinberg, Illinois Family Law 101 (1998).
105 In the absence of intervention by a court or social service agency, shuttling a child
back and forth between parents sharing custody andlor visitation presents an opportunity
for the person who has committed abuse in the past to perpetrate another violent episode.
Further, when parents who have been involved in an abusive relationship share joint power
to make decisions involving the child, additional issues tending to promote confrontation
may arise. The legislative findings of New York's statute makes explicit reference to this
issue, noting that "[s]tudies demonstrate that domestic violence frequently escalates and
intensifies upon the separation of the parties .... [G]reat consideration should be given to
the corrosive impact of domestic violence and the increased danger to the family upon
dissolution and into the foreseeable future." 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, §1. However, there is
no evidence in the legislative history suggesting that lawmakers attempted to fashion a
system that addressed concerns about parental interactions in a manner less intrusive than
terminating parental rights.
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Courts have construed these state statutes liberally and literally.
As courts have applied statutory presumptions, they have not evalu-
ated whether particular children viewed, felt affected by, or were af-
fected by domestic violence in the household. Rather, an individual's
partner abuse "serves as a beacon to the trier of fact of his potential
for violence and physical harm.' u0 6 The courts have inferred this vio-
lent tendency and taken measures to insulate the child in the absence
of any evidence of child abuse; in at least one case, the father's assault
against the mother required not only that the mother be given cus-
tody, but also that the father's visits with the child be supervised.107
More tellingly, to the extent that legislators have, in fact, "gotten
it right," their efforts are duplicative of the best interest standard. The
best interest standard has represented a shift away from consideration
of spousal abuse in child custody hearings.'08 If proponents of legisla-
tion are correct in asserting that spousal batterers are child abusers,
the legislation is coextensive with the current "best interest of the
child" standard. If spousal abuse and child abuse are synonymous,
batterers in most cases would be found unfit during custody hearings
in the absence of any presumption.
The language of adopted provisions suggests that legislators may
not actually assume-as with most presumptions-that there is a di-
rect correlation between child and partner abuse. Ohio's statute, for
example, mandates that courts consider "[any] history of, or potential
for, child abuse, spouse abuse, [and] other domestic violence .... "109
Since the wording of this statute considers spousal and child abuse
separately, it seems implausible that legislators consider spousal and
106 Williams v. Williams (In re Custody of Williams), 432 N.E.2d 375, 376 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); accord In re Marriage of Wiley, 556 N.E.2d 809, 813-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
that allegations of father's domestic violence against mother were relevant and decisive
factors in custody determination irrespective of violence toward children, because
"'continuing physical abuse by one parent to another will cause emotional damage to a
child and thus constitute neglect"' (quoting In re Interest of A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487, 492
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989))). In light of these presumptions, appellate courts have held that
awarding custody to parents who have been abusive toward their partner, in light of these
presumptions, constitutes abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Rinehart v. Rinehart, 877 S.W.2d
205,209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); see also Jack M. Dalgleish, Jr., Annotation, Construction and
Effect of Statutes Mandating Consideration of, or Creating Presumptions Regarding, Do-
mestic Violence in Awarding Custody of Children, 51 A.L.R. 5th 241 (1997) ("In some
instances, the legislatures have created a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has
perpetrated domestic violence may not be awarded custody of a child.").
107 See Tracy D.S. v. Danny D.W., Nos. CN93-11783, 96-37561, 1997 WL 905950, at *2
(Del. Fain. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997).
108 Prior to implementation of the "best interest of the child" standard, the relationship
between the parents was the primary criterion for awarding custody; the "best interest"
standard de-emphasizes such considerations. See Cahn, supra note 100, at 1043.
109 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3109.04(F)(2)(c) (west 1995).
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child abuse as proxies. The policy basis for legislative presumptions is
undermined by their evidentiary requirements: None of the statutes
concerning custody require a showing that a child has been exposed
to, or directly victimized by, domestic violence.
Further, to the extent that legislators have "gotten it wrong," stat-
utory presumptions are not merely duplicative of, but are in opposi-
tion to, the best interest standards. In Kraft v. Kraft, to for example, a
trial court, following a statutory rule permitting ongoing domestic vio-
lence as an evidentiary factor in awarding child custody, transferred
child custody from the mother to the father based on the changed
circumstance that the mother was currently living with a man who had
assaulted her."I The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded for
consideration in accordance with the state's relevant statutory pre-
sumption regarding the mother's allegation that the petitioning father
had also assaulted her." 2 The domestic violence committed by the
father had occurred five years previous to the case, and the domestic
violence committed by the mother's current partner was ongoing.113
The court did not differentiate between past and current domestic vio-
lence in terms of its effect on the child involved, a curious omission if
the court intended for the contested child to be awarded to the house-
hold with the least potential for violence (assuming a link exists be-
tween abuse of partner and abuse of child).'1 4 While the lower court
had argued that the effect of applying the presumption against the
father was "that domestic violence perpetrated by a parent at any time
in the past is given more weight than ongoing, present-day evidence of
domestic violence by a live-in boyfriend," the supreme court insisted
on a more rigorous application of the statutory presumption against
the father on remand." 5 This case ultimately suggests that even if the
alleged paramount consideration was the best interest of the child (in
particular, protecting him or her from possible violence), the court
110 554 N.W.2d 657 (N.D. 1996).
111 See id. at 658-59; see also N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2(I)(k) (1997) ('The court
shall consider [the significant other's] history of inflicting, or tendency to inflict, physical
harm, bodily injury, assault, or the fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, on other
persons.").
112 N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (1997) states:
If the court finds credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred,....
this [evidence] creates a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpe-
trated domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody of a child.
This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that
the best interests of the child require that parent's participation as a custodial
parent.
113 See Kraft, 554 N.W.2d at 661.
114 See id.
115 Id.
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was more concerned with punishing the father for criminal marital be-
havior than assessing what living situation might presently pose the
most danger to the child.
Even a finding that abusive behavior toward a partner was past,
minimal, and not directed toward children in the relationship may not
overcome a statutory presumption against physical custody. 116 Statu-
tory presumptions against child custody for persons convicted of do-
mestic abuse, at best, do the same work as best interest statutes and,
at worst, impede them; such presumptions place punishment of par-
ents above the protection of the child's interests.
B. Sex Crimes
Courts and legislatures generally limit policing of domestic vio-
lence perpetrators to regulation of the household in which the abuse
occurred.117 Regardless of whether or not children were abused by
their parent or exposed to abuse between their parents, they lived in a
household where abuse occurred, and the abuse colorably implicated
the domestic relationships formed by the persons who committed do-
mestic violence. Sanctions against persons convicted of sexual of-
fenses, in contrast, are not limited to either the particular relationships
in which sex crimes were committed or even the class of persons
against whose member the assault was perpetrated; the scope of rele-
vant legislation and adjudication is far more general. As the general-
ity of the legislation suggests, proponents of statutory provisions
against persons convicted of sexual offenses obtaining child custody
do not ground their arguments in social science literature. There is an
honest, credible debate raging in the academic community over
whether or not people who abuse their partners are unusually likely
also to abuse their children;118 this sort of debate is not the foundation
for statutory prohibitions respecting persons convicted of violent sex-
ual offenses, and it is still further removed from adjudicative custody
116 See, e.g., Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825, 826 (N.D. 1995). The North Dakota
statute interpreted in Bruner permits the presumption against custody for persons perpe-
trating domestic violence to be overcome "only by clear and convincing evidence that the
best interests of the child require that parent's participation as a custodial parent." N.D.
Cent. Code § 14-09-06.2(1)(j). Delaware's statute provides further illustration of the high
level of evidence necessary to overcome presumptions. The statute requires that there
have been no further acts of domestic violence and that the abusive partner have (1) suc-
cessfully completed a counseling program for persons who batter partners; (2) successfully
completed drug or alcohol counseling at the court's request; and (3) demonstrated that
giving the partner certain custodial rights is in the best interest of the child or that ex-
traordinary circumstances warrant rejection of the presumption. See Del. Code Ann. tit.
13, § 705A(c) (1999).
117 But see supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 97-100.
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determinations based on the illegal conduct of parents, such as deter-
minations that lesbians and statutory rapists cannot obtain custody.
This Section will first discuss statutory presumptions and prohibitions
against persons who have committed sexual offenses from obtaining
custody, and then examine individual court cases where judges have
used the convicted or presumptive sexual conduct of parents to deny
custody.
1. Violent Sexual Offenses
During the 1990s, several states enacted statutory presumptions
or prohibitions against persons convicted of sexual offenses from ob-
taining child custody or living in households containing children. 1 9
The majority of these statutes only contemplate persons who have
committed sexual offenses against minors (albeit not minors to whom
the convicted persons were related or who lived in their house-
hold);'2o Alabama's statute, however, does not limit itself to policing
persons whose past criminal activity concerned children.1 21
Alabama's statute showcases the extent to which the civil status
of persons convicted of sexual offenses has been decoupled from legit-
imate arguments about the danger posed by these persons once re-
leased. The statute bars, for life, persons convicted of sexual offenses
from living in households with children. 122 The crimes implicated in
119 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-20-26(c) (Supp. 1999); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-305(a)
(Michie Supp. 1999); Cal. Far. Code § 3030(a) (West Supp. 2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 72.09.340(3) (West Supp. 2000).
1m See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-305(a); Cal. Faro. Code § 3030(a); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 72.09.340(3).
121 Under Alabama's statute, a criminal sex offense is defined as:
a. Rape in the first or second degree .... b. Sodomy in the first or second
degree .... c. Sexual torture .... d. Sexual abuse in the first or second
degree .... e. Enticing a child to enter a vehicle, room, house, office, or other
place for immoral purposes .... L Promoting prostitution in the first or sec-
ond degree .... g. Violation of the Alabama Child Pornography Act ....
h. Kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent, in the first or second degree ....
i. Incest... when the offender is an adult and the victim is a minor ....
j. Soliciting a child by computer for the purposes of committing a sexual act
and transmitting obscene material to a child by computer.... k. Any solcita-
tion, attempt, or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses listed in paragraphs
a. to j., inclusive .... 1. Any crime committed in any state or a federal, mili-
tary, Indian, or a foreign country jurisdiction which, if it had been committed
in this state... would constitute an offense listed in paragraphs a. to k.,
inclusive.
Ala. Code § 15-20-21(4) (Supp. 1999).
1M2 See id. § 15-20-26 (Supp. 1999). The bulk of this legislation prescribes notification
procedures for persons convicted of sexual offenses; the ability of convicted persons to
form households including children, therefore, is tied to general provisions governing con-
victed persons' relationship to the community into which they are released. See, e.g., id.
§ 15-20-22 (Supp. 1999).
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the statute neither uniformly involve children nor uniformly involve
violence; the offenses enumerated include sodomy and promoting
prostitution,'23 crimes which, while certainly violative of both criminal
codes and traditional social norms, are traditionally considered "devi-
ance" rather than offenses with clear victims. The inclusion of these
crimes suggests that legislators are concerned with the threat to mo-
rality posed by offenders, rather than, or in addition to, their threat to
society. It is difficult to perceive what the safety-based argument
might be for protecting children from persons who have engaged in
sodomy or prostitution. It seems unlikely, for example, that legisla-
tors were concerned that adults would sell into prostitution the chil-
dren with whom they formed households. The more plausible
explanation for this broadly drawn statute is that Alabama wished to
restrict children's exposure to people engaged in "immoral lifestyles"
that were also illegal. The custody law thus forms an additional ele-
ment of social stigma and punishment for persons for whom society
wishes to express particularized moral opprobrium, and whose status
as convicted offenders society wishes to enshrine, 2 4
The Alabama statute seriously affects family (re)formation. Be-
cause Alabama's provisions affect convicted persons for the rest of
their lives, once convicted, these persons may never marry an individ-
ual with children and reside in their household."-5 Persons who have
committed sexual offenses may reside in a household with their own
children, but juveniles or young adults who commit sexual offenses
cannot reside in a household with their siblings.' 26 Lest it be thought
that the statute was drafted so broadly by mistake, it should be noted
that the original statute was enacted in 1996 and amended in 1998 to
include juveniles.127
Statutes enacted in Arkansas, California, and Washington seem
facially less troublesome; these statutes only affect the ability of per-
sons convicted of sexual offenses against children to live in homes
with children, and the Arkansas and Washington statutes only affect
123 See id. § 15-20-21(4).
124 For similar analysis in the context of lesbian custody cases, see infra notes 14448 and
accompanying text.
125 When one considers that family formation is one of the factors that affects recidivism
rates, this provision seems particularly ill-advised from a policy perspective. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
126 See Mike Cason, Some Juvenile Sex Offenders Can't Go Home, Montgomery Ad-
vertiser, Sept. 10, 1998, at 1A, available in Lexis, News Library, Montad file (quoting Ala-
bama Attorney General Bill Pryor).
127 See id.
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convicted persons during the period of their probation.12s Further,
these statutes are presumptions against custody, in contrast with the
Alabama statute's absolute prohibition (although the requirements to
overcome these presumptions can be substantial). 129 Some aspects of
these statutes, however, are actually tougher on released persons; in
particular, none of these states makes exception for the person's own
children. 30 California's statute, further, was amended in 1998 to cre-
ate a presumption, not only against physical custody for persons con-
victed of sexual offenses, but against any legal custody, including
visitation. 13 '
What these statutes represent, ultimately, is the extent to which
the criminal justice system has abandoned historical notions of recla-
mation, reformation, or rehabilitation, and has begun to assume that
"criminals" are simply unable to rehabilitate. These statutes, taken
together with Alabama's, suggest that concerned legislatures no
longer make any pretense that prison and parole serve to reintroduce
convicted persons to society or reintegrate them into their community.
Rather, these statutes serve as permanent markers for individuals, cre-
ating a barrier between them and the population into which they are
released. The legislative history of these statutes suggests that legisla-
tures are responding, not to cases where individuals have been
granted custody and committed abuse against a child, but to persons
who have committed sexual offenses as a class.m32
128 See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-305(a) (Michie Supp. 1999); Cal. Faro. Code § 3030(a)
(West 1994 & Supp. 2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 72.09.340(3) (West Supp. 2000).
129 See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-305(a); Cal. Fain. Code § 3030(a); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 72.09.340(3). California's statute was amended in 1998 to require that the court
enter its finding of "no significant risk to the child" in writing.
130 See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-305(a) ("[T]he court shall prohibit, as a condition of
granting probation, the accused, upon release, from residing in a residence with any minor,
unless the court makes a specific finding that the accused poses no danger to the minors
residing in residence."); Cal. Fain. Code § 3030(a) ("No person shall be granted physical or
legal custody of, or unsupervised visitation with, a child if the person is required to be
registered as a sex offender.., where the victim was a minor... unless the court finds that
there is no significant risk to the child."); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 72.09.340(3) (" The
department shall not approve a residence location if the proposed location: (a) Includes a
minor victim or child of similar age or circumstances as a previous victim who the depart-
ment determines may be put at substantial risk of harm by the offender's residence in the
household ... .").
131 See Cal. Fain. Code § 3030(a).
132 In considering presumptions against custody for persons who have committed sexual
offenses against children, the California Senate Committee on the Judiciary noted two de-
velopments motivating a proposed amendment: Frst, that "[t]he author has become awiare
of at least one recent case, now on appeal, where a superior court judge held the custody/
unsupervised visitation prohibition of Family Code section 3030 did not apply to a felony
sex crime (lewd and lascivious acts on a child)" and, second, that Marc Klaas had corre-
sponded with the Chair of the Committee to urge that the statute be amended to include
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Even in the absence of such statutes, judges may use sexual of-
fenses against persons seeking to form households in which children
reside. In 1996, the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida revoked
probation for Fernando Benavides, who had been paroled on a sexual
offense, and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison for failing to
obtain written permission to date and move in with a woman with
minor children. 133 Trial court testimony reflected that Benavides was
not suspected of any misconduct toward the children, nor was any sug-
gestion made that he might have had an inappropriate relationship
with the children.134 Benavides' counselor was aware of his living ar-
rangement, and his domestic partner occasionally attended his coun-
seling sessions with him in contemplation of marriage.1 35 Benavides'
conviction was overturned on the grounds that his counselor had been
aware of his living situation, and, thus, his parole violation was not
"willful and substantial"; however, this case highlights that strictures
against persons convicted of sexual offenses residing with children are
less about the actual danger they pose to children or harm they perpe-
trate, than about permanently separating convicted persons from
children.
Whatever one thinks of the ultimate policy wisdom of a blanket
rule prohibiting those who transgressed society's moral code from in-
teracting with impressionable children, such a broad prohibition
marks a new method of allocating child custody. Rather than allocat-
ing custody solely according to family law principles, new custody
rules take into consideration the status of the potential parent as a
"criminal" and use deprivation of custody as an additional sanction.
2. Nonviolent Sexual Offenses: Statutory Rape and Sodomy
Statutory rape is a crime of strict liability: When persons of ages
enumerated in criminal statutes have sexual relations, the older part-
ner commits a crime whether or not the relationship is consensual.136
felony offenses committed against children. Family Law: Child Custody and Visitation:
Hearing on S. 25 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 1993-94, 1st Extraord. Sess. (Cal.
1994), available in Westlaw, CCA-OLD database. Marc Klaas's daughter, Polly Klaas,
was kidnapped and murdered by a person convicted of violent sexual offenses. See Josh
Getlin, Waiting, Hoping, Praying, L.A. Times, Oct. 18, 1993, at El. It is difficult to link
these two factors with any real or even reasonably perceived broader problem of persons
convicted of sexual offenses winning custody and subsequently abusing their children.
133 See Benavides v. State, 679 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Benavides
had married the woman by the time of the appellate court's ruling, although the appellate
court did not find this fact significant. See id. at 1196 n.2.
134 See id. at 1196 n.3.
135 See id. at 1196.
136 See, e.g., Charles A. Phipps, Children, Adults, Sex and the Criminal Law: In Search
of Reason, 22 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1, 41-77 (1997) (surveying statutory schemes of 50 states
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While these convictions do not fall within the statutory presumptions
earlier detailed, they are used less formally to deny a man custody of
the children he fathers through the statutory rape. 3 7 Rights are not
terminated because the father has abused or neglected the child;
rather, rights are terminated before the father knows of the child's
existence or has had an opportunity to form a relationship with the
child. The premise for termination is that parental rights cannot arise
from a criminal act. 38 The logic underlying these decisions is that
criminals should not-quite literally-enjoy the fruits of their
crime.139 Nonetheless, in many cases, the best interest of the child
cannot be served by denying custodial rights to the convicted father.
Although the father has shown no particular potential to endanger the
child, and although statutory rape may not indicate the propensity of
the individual to act in a violent, abusive, or neglectful manner, the
fact of conviction has been held sufficient to terminate rights.
Similarly, the fact that a parent presumably is committing an ifle-
gal act by forming a domestic partnership with a member of the same
sex has been used to deny the parent custody. 140 When reviewing cus-
todial arrangements involving gay parents, courts have often included
considerations of the parent's sexual orientation when determining
the "best interest of the child." 141 The illegal nature142 of the parent's
and noting that "the very nature of the offense recognizes that a child is incapable of con-
senting; thus, an adult who has intercourse with a child is always engaged in forcible and
nonconsensual conduct").
137 See Angela D. Lucchese, Note, Pena v. Mattox: The Parental Rights of a Statutory
Rapist, 36 Brandeis J. Fain. L. 285, 291-94 (1998).
138 See, e.g., Pefia v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir. 1996). Amanda Mattox, age 15,
and Ruben Pefia, age 19, were dating for a year when Mattox became pregnant. Immedi-
ately following Mattox's delivery, Pefia was arrested and, originally, falsely charged %ith
felony statutory rape; the charge was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor. Mhile Pefta
was in jail, unable to make bail, Mattox's parents drove her to a state where a father's
consent is not necessary to place the child of a minor up for adoption; the child was put up
for adoption in this state. Eighteen months later Pefia brought suit for deprivation of pa-
rental rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Seventh Circuit rejected his claim. See Peria, 84
F.3d at 895-96.
139 See Lucchese, supra note 137, at 292-93.
140 See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying custody to
lesbian mother); In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90,97 (NJ. Super. Ct. Clh. Div. 1974) (restricting
visitation rights of homosexual father), aff'd, 362 A.2d 54 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976);
Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (denying custody to lesbian mother).
141 Courts historically have taken one of three approaches to dealing with parents' sex-
ual orientation: (1) per se determination that gay parents are unfit as a matter of la~w, (2)
presumption of harm from exposure to the social stigma attached to homosexuality,
prompting courts to forbid parents from exposing the child to their "gay lifestyle"; (3)
homosexuality as a factor in custodial determination if there is a nexus between the par-
ents' sexual orientation and harm to the child, requiring an evidentiary showing that the
orientation harms the child. See Katja M. Eichinger-Swainston, Note, Fox v. Fox: Rede-
fining the Best Interest of the Child Standard for Lesbian Mothers and Their Families, 32
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consensual sexual actiity' 43-rather than any demonstrated deleteri-
ous effects on the child whose custody is in consideration-has been
used to deny the gay parent custody, most notably in the well-publi-
cized case of Bottoms v. Bottoms. 44 The cases in which the illegal
Tulsa L.J. 57, 58-59 (1996); cf. Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relation-
ships: An Equal Protection Analysis, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 617, 630 (1989) (noting that courts
typically justify sodomy laws on basis that child might be harassed or stigmatized, child
might not grow up heterosexual, child's moral development could be harmed, and state
sodomy statute mandates denial or restriction of custody).
142 Five states retain sodomy laws that implicitly criminalize gay relationships. See Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997); Kan. Crim. Code Ann. §§ 21-350t(2), 21-3505 (West
1999); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 750.338, 750.338a (West 1991); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 566.090
(West 1999); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06 (West 1994). Fourteen states criminalize oral
and anal sex in a gender-neutral fashion. See Ala. Code § 13A-6-63 (1994); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1411, 13-1412 (West 1989); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 800.02 (West Supp. 2000);
Idaho Code § 18-6605 (1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:89 (West 1986); Md. Code Ann. art.
27, § 553 (1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 750.158, 750.338b (West 1991); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.293 (West 1987); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-59 (1999); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-177 (1999); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 888 (West Supp. 2000); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-
120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1995); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-361
(Michie 1996).
Sodomy laws are not generally enforced per se-few individuals are prosecuted specif-
ically for acts of consensual sodomy. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1147 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (noting that sodomy statute was not enforced through criminal prosecutions);
Richard D. Mohr, Gays/Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and Law 51 (1988) ("[Slodomy
laws are virtually never enforced."); Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 4, 292 (1992)
(noting that sodomy laws are "dead letters"); see also Al Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in
Sodomy Case; Different Outcome Seen Likely if Homosexual Had Been Prosecuted,
Wash. Post, July 13, 1986, at Al (noting that Justice Powell changed his vote overnight in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), because Hardwick had not been prosecuted for
sodomy). States may, however, retain these laws in order to stigmatize gay and lesbian
sexual relationships. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted
by 'Unenforced' Sodomy Laws (forthcoming 2000).
143 Sodomy laws are facially neutral with respect to the sexual orientation of the persons
engaging in proscribed sexual activity, but the application of sodomy laws has evolved over
time such that only same-sex couples are affected. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and
the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82
Iowa L. Rev. 1007, 1012 (1997) (stating that in 1880s sodomy laws became increasingly
enforced against same-sex couples); see also Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 531, 542 n.48 (1992) (arguing that sodomy statutes are understood
by society as "homosexual laws"). Further, there are no cases in which the conduct of
heterosexual parents engaged in activity prohibited by sodomy laws formed a basis for
terminating custody.
144 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). In Bottoms, the
trial court denied physical custody to Sharon Bottoms, granting custody instead to
Sharon's mother. The basis for denial of custody was that Bottoms' lesbian relationship
rendered her an unfit parent: "'The mother's conduct is illegal.... I will tell you that it
is the opinion of the court that her conduct is immoral. And it is the opinion of this court
that the conduct of Sharon Bottoms renders her an unfit parent."' Id. at 279 (quoting trial
court). The trial court was employing the "per se" standard described supra note 141. The
Virginia appellate court reversed. See 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). The Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed once again, awarding custody to Bottoms' mother. See 457
S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). See generally Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian
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nature of the parent's homosexual relations is used to deny custody
provide a sharp illustration of the extent to which the construction
of parent as criminal is both complete and permanent: In states
where sodomy remains illegal, a parent with a gay sexual orien-
tation is by definition "criminal,"1 45 presumptively "unfit" for
parenthood. The criminal sanctions attached to this sexual acti-
vity, in the context of consensual gay relationships, permit courts
that consider gay sexuality immoral146 to limit or terminate the cus-
todial rights of persons who transgress the law without resorting
to tenuous arguments about how the parent's sexual orientation
might affect "the best interest of the child."147 Courts use the
Mother and the Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 Yale JL. & Feminism
341, 357-64 (1995).
145 In a Tennessee custody case, a lesbian mother was repeatedly described as a "crimi-
nal" during the proceedings because of her lesbian relationships. See Patricia A. Cain,
Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L Rev. 1551, 1588 (1993).
Persons who commit acts of sodomy are often explicitly categorized as criminals: For ex-
ample, some states that require registration of sexual offenders specifically require gay
men convicted of consensual sodomy to also register. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-11-200
(1994); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 589.400(1)(4) (West Supp. 2000); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-
430(c)(10) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
146 Sodomy statutes survive, in part, for the purpose of constructing same-sex relations
as immoral. See, e.g., Kenneth L Karst, Law's Promise, Law's Expression: Vsions of
Power in the Politics of Race, Gender, and Religion 58 (1993). Further, gay persons who
are "blatant" about their sexual orientation particularly are subject to custody review. See
Katherine Arnup & Susan Boyd, Familial Disputes? Sperm Donors, Lesbian Mothers, and
Legal Parenthood, in Legal Inversians: Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Politics of Law 77,82-
83 (Didi Herman & Carl Stychin eds., 1995):
'Good' lesbian mothers-women who live quiet, discreet lives, who promise
that they will raise their children to be heterosexual ... have in recent years
increasingly succeeded in winning custody of their children. 'Bad' lesbian
mothers-women who are open about their sexual orientation, who attend gay
and lesbian demonstrations and other public events, and who view their lesbi-
anism positively-are almost certain to lose custody of their children to their
ex-husbands.
147 See, e.g., Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510,513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (equating
parent's homosexual relationship with "illicit sexual conduct" that adversely affects child);
Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that "possibility of homosexual
conduct" would negatively affect child); L v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240,244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932)
(same); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Va. 1985) (same). In addition, the criminality of
homosexuality has also been used to demonstrate that the parent is unfit. See, e.g., In re
R.W. v. D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998).
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Mississippi has considered the fitness of gay custo-
dians and denied custodial access without "resorting" to a discussion of the criminal behav-
ior of petitioning parents. See Weigand v. Houghton, 730 So. 2d 581, 596 (Miss. 1999). In
Weigand, the court considered a gay father's petition to alter his son's custodial relation-
ship given the presence of domestic violence in the home of his ex-wife. In considering
whether the chancellor had appropriately considered the child's best interest, the supreme
court determined that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong in finding that the father's
gay relationship and the mother's exposure of the child to religious training required leav-
ing the child in the mother's physical custody. The chancellor had given great weight to the
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same logic to prevent gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from adopting
children.' 48
Two final observations should be made with respect to custody
determinations and gay parents. First, the fact that sodomy remains
illegal in several states in contrast with other traditionally proscribed
sexual relationships indicates a continuing social opprobrium of ho-
mosexuality in some states. This opprobrium, discursively with the il-
legal nature of the conduct, renders judges more likely to examine the
homosexual activity of a parent.1 49 Secondly, while consensual sod-
omy does remain illegal in several states, it is rarely prosecuted as a
crime;150 the only punishment persons who commit the illegal act re-
ceive is, thus, collateral. In other words, depriving gay parents of cus-
tody is the punishment society intends to mete out for implicated
parents.
C. Drug Offenses
Both domestic violence custody presumptions and sex offender
prohibitions have the explicit force of statutory law behind them. In
contrast, drug-related convictions and findings of controlled substance
use are not treated legislatively as separate factors courts must con-
sider when making custody determinations, but are employed by
courts as implicitly subsumed in general best interest of the child con-
siderations. Courts do not consider findings that parents have created
actual harm: The argument for separating parents convicted of drug-
related offenses from their children is not founded upon a claim of
direct abuse.15' Even the most emphatic opponents of child custody
moral fitness of the father, "an admitted homosexual who lives with and engages in sexual
activities with another on a day-to-day basis," and a parent who "admits that a heterosex-
ual lifestyle would have no adverse effect, while acknowledging that a homosexual lifestyle
or homosexual activity may well have the opposite effect." Id. The supreme court vacated
the lower court's sua sponte decision to preclude the father's partner from being present
during visitation. See id. at 587.
148 See, e.g., In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 727 P.2d 830 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (finding that applicant's bisexuality may be used to prevent him from
adopting children).
149 See Leslie, supra note 142.
150 In terms of enforcement, sodomy law should be distinguished from both drug and
domestic violence law. While it is true that the majority of drug and domestic violence
transgressions are not punished, domestic violence crimes usually go unpunished because
the victims are pressured or frightened out of reporting the incidents that generally occur
in their private homes, and drug violations go unpunished simply because the drug trade is
so widespread-when drug users and purveyors are caught, they are in fact punished. In
contrast, many gay persons live openly in states with sodomy laws where, despite the ease
of detection, these crimes are very rarely prosecuted.
151 See, e.g., Vernon Mc. v. Brenda N., 602 N.Y.S.2d 58,60 (App. Div. 1993) (remanding
custody for more in-depth review of mother's conviction, noting that "the mother's convic-
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for persons so convicted do not claim that these parents slip their chil-
dren heroin.15 2 In fact, courts have found that the absence of physical
child abuse constitutes not a mitigating circumstance, but, rather, a
fact attesting "to the parties' good fortune."1m
The argument for denying custody is arguably rooted in a theory
of either potential neglect or exposure to a dangerous "lifestyle" as
per se abuse. In other words, parents who sell or use drugs may ne-
glect their children's basic needs as a result of their drug habits or may
expose their children to weapons and violence in conjunction with
participation in the drug trade.15 Case law, however, belies such a
simple or comforting explanation.
Drug activity and convictions carry express moral taint.15 5 Such
activity, standing alone, without other evidence of poor parental skills
or any evidence that children have been exposed to drug use or trade,
tion for attempted transportation of drugs into this country indicates such a lack of judg-
ment and respect for the law as to warrant a more meaningful appraisal of her parenting
ability than the court's mere observation of her based upon a one-day hearing"). Social
science data does not support the notion that parents who abuse drugs also abuse children.
See Sandra Anderson Garcia, Drug Addiction and MotherlChild Welfare, 13 J. Legal Med.
129,167 (1992) ("Although it seems logical to assume that drug addicts have a predilection
for child abuse and neglect because of the panoply of social and psychological problems
that often attend addiction, evidence that pregnant addicts later abuse their babies is
equivocal and largely undocumented.").
152 The situation of women convicted of drug offenses should be contrasted with direct
criminal prosecutions of and custody decisions regarding women who "deliver" drugs to
fetuses in vitro while pregnant. See Barrie Becker & Judge Peggy Hora, The Legal Com-
munity's Response to Drug Use During Pregnancy in the Criminal Sentencing and Depen-
dency Contexts: A Survey of Judges, Prosecuting Attorneys, and Defense Attorneys in
Ten California Counties, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 527, 527-28 (1993); Lorraine
Schmall, Addicted Pregnancy as a Sex Crime, 13 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 263,265-66 (1993). But
see Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (determining that transmission of
cocaine during birthing process via umbilical cord did not constitute "delivery" of drug to
minor).
153 Deskin v. Clarke County Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0623-97-4, 1997 WIL 727746, at *1
(Va. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997).
154 For example, parents might explicitly harm their child by supplying them with illegal
drugs. See, e.g., In re Marrs, Nos. 97-CA-79, 97-CA-80, 1998 WVL 896669, at *5 (Ohio CL
App. Dec. 28,1998) (barring custody for father previously convicted of corrupting child by
providing illicit drugs); see also Garcia, supra note 151, at 129.
155 Drug-related convictions tend to be grouped with "immoral" behavior rather than
with evidence of a parent's neglect, abuse, or general relationship with the child. See, e.g.,
Kroics v. Kroics, 705 So. 2d 1302, 1305 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (finding as follows:
[MVe see little positive for the child to identify with in the instant case and
much to negatively influence him. Presently, Sharon lives in a house with her
second child, who is illegitimate .... Sharon's sister is also an illegitimate
child, and, at the age of nineteen, has two illegitimate children of her own,
from two different fathers .... In fact, the record indicates that almost all of
the people in that household have been convicted of drug violations. For ex-
ample, while pregnant with Michael Thomas, Sharon was charged with, and
later convicted of, possession with intent to distribute marijuana .... Lastly,
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may terminate all parental rights. 156 The mere fact of conviction-
even in the absence of physical incarceration-has also been deter-
mined to constitute the sort of "change of circumstance" requiring re-
view of custody arrangements. 5 7 The use of drugs within the home,
even in the absence of either criminal conviction or any evidence of
presence of or affect-on children, also can be used as a factor in deny-
ing custody.' 58 Courts commonly deny persons who use drugs custody
or visitation, and often entirely terminate parental rights.1 59 Because
courts make custody determinations in the absence of evidence of
abuse, they are forced to rely on stereotypical constructions of drug
users, assuming that persons involved with drugs are necessarily poor
parents. 60 Judges often step outside the judicial role to lecture drug-
using parents. For example, one appellate court stated that "[w]e
hope that the mother has learned her lesson that illegal drug usage
and child custody are not compatible."'161 Further, courts terminate
custody based on the argument that parents who would risk legal op-
Sharon's companion, who often visited the house, was being prosecuted for
drug-related offenses at the time of the hearing.);
see also Janet L. Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and "Crack" Abuse, 56
Brook. L. Rev. 1213, 1253 (1991) (discussing substance use and its role in child neglect
proceedings and finding that "[t]he decision that a woman who uses drugs during preg-
nancy has no right to the resulting baby is essentially a moral decision. The difficulty with
such a decision is that the court's focus shifts away from the best interest of the child, and
toward punishing the mother.").
156 In In re Kennedy, 550 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1989), the court determined that the
best interest of the child required that the father be given custody. The mother had a
criminal record that included drug crimes; her mother and brothers, with whom she did not
live, had previously been convicted of drug crimes and burglary. See id. at 74. The court
did not credit the mother's claim that the father had committed physical abuse against the
child on one occasion. See id.
157 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ortiz, 790 P.2d 555, 557 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), af'd, 801
P.2d 767 (Or. 1990) (finding change of circumstance requiring reconsideration of visitation
after father's drug conviction). Notably, Oregon's custody statute permits the court to
consider the "conduct, marital status, income, social environment, or iifestyle of either
party only if it is shown that any of these factors are causing or may cause emotional or
physical damage to the child." See Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.137(3) (1997).
158 See Bowman v. Bowman, 686 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (finding no error
in trial court's consideration of mother's use of marijuana with man with whom she mar-
ried and resided and further noting that man was convicted of drug-related offenses and
incarcerated after he and mother separated).
159 See generally Mary E. Taylor, Annotation, Parent's Use of Drugs as Factor in Award
of Custody of Children, Visitation Rights, or Termination of Parental Rights, 20 A.LR.5th
534 (1994).
160 See Lauren Shapiro, An HIV Advocate's View of Family Court: Lessons from a
Broken System, 5 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 133, 153 (1998) ("Too often, hysteria and
stereotypes about parents with drug use histories dominate the decisionmaking process
about whether children are at risk from a parent's drug addiction or history of drug
addiction.").
161 In re Marriage of Johnson, 962 P.2d 752, 755 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
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probrium through drug involvement are unfit.162 Fially, courts termi-
nate parental fights based on the drug convictions of persons with
whom parents choose to form families. In one such case, a Penn-
sylvania court terminated the parental rights of a mother for refusing
to cease contact with her partner, the child's natural father, whose
parental rights previously had been terminated after a drug
conviction.163
While presumptions against domestic violence perpetrators
predominantly affect men,'64 drug-based sanctions not only involve
both genders, but seem particularly likely to be levied against women.
In part this is because women and minorities have been especially
hard hit in terms of convictions by the war on drugs.165 The dispro-
portionate effect on women also may be related to the higher percent-
age of women who have physical custody of their children in the first
place. It may also be the case that courts tend to treat drug use as
passive abuse or neglect, and courts may hold women more responsi-
ble for such passive abuse. Fimally, custodial determinations with re-
spect to drug involvement are most likely to be levied against lower-
class women, as the substance use of middle and upper-class persons is
less likely to come to the court's attention.16
CONCLUSION
Persons who have committed criminal acts always may have been
constructed as "other," but recent statutory enactments and case law
162 See, e.g., Williams v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Servs., No. 14-98-
00700-CV, 2000 WL 4939, at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 6,2000) ("IThe record indicates that
even after knowing his parental rights were in jeopardy, appellant continued to engage in
criminal activity that resulted in him being jailed.").
163 See In re Adoption of M.A.R., 591 A.2d 1133,1136-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); cf. State
v. McSweeney, 860 P.2d 305,306 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (conditioning mother's probation on
requirement that she not reside with spouse if he resumed drug use).
164 But see supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing increase in incarceration
rates for women and minorities, driven by drug-related crimes). While the arrest rate for
whites committing drug offenses has been level at 300 per 100,000 from 1970 until the
present, the arrest rate for blacks-300 per 100,000 in 1968-topped out at 1,500 per
100,000 in 1990 and leveled off to 1,050 per 100,000 in 1992. See Morris, supra note 37, at
215. For a broader discussion of racism in criminal justice, see generally Randall Kennedy,
Race, Crime, and the Law (1997).
166 See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 155, at 1228 (stating that:
Neglect proceedings in general, and those brought against parents who
misuse alcohol or drugs in particular, are almost always brought against poor
parents .... Longstanding differences in the way American family law treats
the rich and the poor have affected the law's approach to neglect proceedings.
... Mhe drug habits of middle class families are rarely investigated by the
state, or made the subject of neglect proceedings in court.).
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represent a modem formalization of othering. Historically, persons
convicted of crimes were reformable, treatable, rehabilitatable. Now,
persons released, as well as persons never considered sufficiently dan-
gerous to lock up, are treated in courts and by law as too volatile or
unreliable to entrust with the care of children.
The best interest of the child standard permits courts to take into
account the arguments made by proponents of presumptions against
child custody for persons who participate in criminal activity. A child
whose parent's drug addiction renders the parent unable to supervise
her is better placed with a parent who can; a child who is afraid of her
father because of the violence he has committed against her mother
may be better left in her mother's care. As the cases outlined by this
Note in the context of drug-related crimes indicate, courts can and do
consider conduct relevant to child care when that conduct is
presented. However, the denial of custody to persons who have been
convicted of crimes or have participated in criminal activity based on
the fact of that activity, rather than on its demonstrated impact on the
child, signals that something is afoot other than an interest in protect-
ing children.
As new legal measures reduce complicated conduct into pre-
sumptions against custody and collaterally deprive parents of access to
their children, they extend or substitute punishment of parents by the
criminal law. The parent is denied custody, not because he or she has
mistreated the child, but because the parent is the "sort of person"
who might.
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